As I read news about various attempts to modernize Middle East, one disparity jumped out. Often, the West would celebrate every bit of cultural and legal progress, yet there was preciously little news in the economic front. In fact, if anything, the West (especially the US) actively works to reduce importation of the region's most important product, oil. For example, American-led forces occupied Afghanistan and Iraq for almost a decade; from this, we seem to only hear news like woman education, election, and such, yet we rarely (if ever) seen anything "Made in Afghanistan" or celebrate, says, completion of a factory. In my humble opinion, this disparity is the very reason for the failure to establish a stable, self-sufficient governments and societies in these countries.
Before continuing, let me clarify something. I think that social and legal progresses are extremely important. The subjugation and debasement of women in those society are completely unacceptable. Education and election anchor stability and modernization. I wholeheartedly believe those above points.
That said, order of execution also plays a vital role in success and failure. In fact, for state and society building, it is among the deciding factor. It's like treating a sick patient. The same set of actions in wrong orders pretty much guarantees a patient's demise. In fact, a right order (eg. test reaction to a drug before administrating it) prevents wrong actions from happening. Same thing here. Sure, we will need to liberate women and stop human trafficking and such. However, do we need to do them first?
There are 2 reasons why this order (culture first, economic second) cannot work out. First, it destabilizes and, in some cases, outright alienates key stakeholders of the society. Second, it can be (and actually is) perceived as belittling the identity, culture, history, and dignity of these societies.
Let's start with the more eminently understandable reason: destabilization and alienation of key, powerful stakeholders. The stakeholders in question are the male elders of these societies. Remember this, so long as a region is not in an all out war, so long as some degree of order and stability is in place, there exist people who prosper and hold power. Furthermore, these people will recruit at least a sizable minority as their minions through shared privilege. For example, in a military dictatorship, the dictator himself (or herself, but female rarely reaches there) and the generals prosper and hold power; furthermore, they also buy support of the army through shared power and dignity (right to abuse civilians, says) and resources (food, weapons, pay, etc.).
In Afghanistan, the rulers are Taliban head honchos and local warlords. They also buy support of many men by giving them (the lesser men) moral superiority and power over their families. For those men, these both appease and chain them: on one hand, it feels good to be told how righteous you are, and it feels good to lord over some other people (i.e. your wives and children); on the other, these men "had" the privileges, which mean they could lose if the regime lost. Humans naturally have a bias against loss. This means that a new regime must give these men more than these privileges (roughly twice more?) for them to feel well compensated.
Fast forward, and we have American invasion of Afghanistan. From Western eyes, this was an act of justice: an international coalition taking down a terrorist organization and establishing order, justice, liberty, and democracy. Probably from Afghan women's eyes, it was a progress: they could now go to school and debate and vote.
However, how does the invasion look through Afghan men eyes? Now, I am clearly not an Afghan man whose life was disrupted by the invasion. However, I can conjecture of what such men may feel. Compared to, says, the women, who at least gained new, significant, day-to-day rights, what did the Afghan men get out of the invasion? Their fragile (violent? terrorist?) order was shattered; their lives and limbs were in danger every moment, awake or asleep. More importantly (because the above 2 points might or might not already happen under Taliban), their rights and privileges over their families were ruined, and whatever livelihoods they had accumulated burned with the bullets and bombs. And what did they get? About nothing. Sure, they can vote, but given that they had not voted for centuries, given that vast majority of election fairness was questionable, what does voting right really really gave them? Furthermore, corruption still ran rampant, so whatever new justice and political systems would not help the regular men anyway.
In other words, Afghan men saw nothing but loss from the invasion. Obviously, there are theoretical ways to counter this. The easiest of which would involve quick building of an economic base. Giving a person a (relatively, of course) decent job means more than just extra income and reduced poverty. It also means giving that person stake in the system. It binds such person with the success and survival of the economic and social way from which the person derives necessities and comforts. However, as said earlier, such news never seemed to come. This disparity means that the men would (women, one may imagine, have more concrete gains) have no stake and much loss. What else would such person do but rebel?
Now, to make the matter worse, men make up roughly half of the population. Furthermore, the cultural conditioning of the region gives them extra respect and importance. This means that their social weight was, at least, more than half of the countries. And the invasion very well pissed them off. So much for liberation.
Of course, I have been talking about Afghanistan, where a terrorist regime rule. Iraq must have been worse. Iraqi government was stable enough to briefly invade Kuwait. Such actions meant that Iraqi internal stability and economic development must be at least higher than Afghanistan. And what do the key players of this country, i.e. the men, get out of the toppling of their government?
So, economic weighting of gain and loss already put the interventions at deep risk. However, there is another factor to all of those social, cultural, and legal reforms. It pretty much guarantees the hostility to the invaders (i.e. "liberators").
Before weighing gain and loss, before debating liberty and slavery, as far as a local is concerned, such reforms are foreign. Foreign in 2 senses: first, foreign because these societies are not well-prepared to implement many of these reforms; second, foreign because the reforms themselves come from a different cultures. The first sense of foreignness, with appropriate determinism and resources, can be overcome. The second, though, is much much harder.
My opinion is that Americans generally are not well versed with the psychology of strangers imposing their ideals (usually at gun points or after destroying indigenous regime). However, for the imposed, this is a slap in the face. Well, maybe more of a spit than a slap. The slap is probably the forceful destruction of their local regimes. After all, the invaders are telling them that their cultures are terrorist, sexist, evil, and generally beneath contempt, and that they should (I meant, must) adopt this new set of ideals that they can barely comprehend. How would you feel if somebody tells you that?
Obviously, there are various (again, theoretical at this point) ways around this. The most obvious way is to through timing. If, says, a group of Iraqis successfully topple their current regime under the banner of liberty and democracy (which is essentially what the Arab Spring was about), Western government can rush in with resources and help. Because the change started within and is represented by the same people of the same culture speaking the same language, the ideals are more likely to be accepted. The second way involves making these culture a part of a the invaders, then convert them over. An example would be to make Afghanistan a developed country, then tell them, you know, developed countries don't treat their women like that. I am pretty sure this is what European Union is about: to integrate Soviet sphere into the West, then to change their minds to adopt Western culture.
Either way, it's important to make the people feel like they belong with the invaders, to make them a part of the coalition, and to give them concrete gains. The lopsided victory of culture changes over economic improvement acted reverse of this. They first stripped a sizable chunk of the population of their privileges, then humiliated their culture and dignity, then lectured them on how to socialize and behave. Such a great plan! And some Americans actually expect the locals to welcome them as liberator. Sometimes I wonder what Bush and co smoked when they plan for Iraq.
Then, what of women liberation and fair election? Are they not worthy of implementation as soon as possible? I am not a woman, so I can be tactless here, but rushing in only hurt the local women in the long run. Remember, things don't disappear just because the laws ban them (like domestic abuse; it happens even in the US). Corrupted laws ban practically nothing. As such, there are a couple of (again, stressing this, theoretical) ways to implement these cultural and sensitive reforms.
First strategy involves step-by-step changes. The change can start with banning the most outrageous and hideous practices (like stoning to death or public beheading or such) or allowing/encouraging the most innocent steps (like free primary public education with sex segregated). Once the first step can be enforced properly, then the next step, slightly more aggressive step, can proceed, like banning child marriage. Then the next step. The idea is to change slowly to avoid backslashes.
Second strategy involves education, but a special kind. In Vietnamese, it's called "new wine in old bottles." The best English translation would be "wolf in sheep's clothing." Sounds bad? It is quite trickery, but not all bad. The strategy is to educate new ideas through existing and respected channels. I think "Iraqi security forces" are good example: instead of having white people shooting down Iraqi rebels (the rebels are terrorists, but they are Iraqi, so will raise Iraqi sympathy when shot down by outsiders), let Iraqi police hunt down Iraqi criminals. Similarly, there are various channels whose usage I don't see. Why don't we send progressive Islam preachers to Afghanistan and Iraq? I actually mean that. Some Americans seem to link "Islam" with "terrorism." However, it needs not be. Islam actually has a much more tolerant history than Christianity (mostly because empires in Middle East had to deal with more diverse population than, says, Holy Roman Empire). Or, mass sponsor Middle Eastern students to study abroad with contract to work in their home countries. Or, buy off (seriously, just buy them off) war lords to implement progressive reforms. The point is: do not call attention to the new ideas; cloak new ideas in old forms, languages, social structures, and rituals. That way, the locals may actually evaluate them rather than just reject out of principles.
Third strategy is out right trading: do this and we will give you that. Note: "this" and "that" must be chosen very very carefully. We want to appear belittling the invaded cultures and traditions. Furthermore, we want to establish long term relationship, not one off actions. A good way of trading, by the way, is to give first, then implement requirement. Remember human nature: we bias against loss. Thus, if we start with, "you do this first," the other party may walk away. Instead, we can say, "well, here is some privilege. Like it? OK, now you need to do this or we take it away." It's hostage trading, essentially. And what's the easiest commodities for trading? Economics, of course. One can imagine a factory who pays well, who then demands that all employees must send their children (girls and boys) to schools. Economic venues (factories, shops, offices) can also be political, educational, and cultural venues. It's the same even in the US: offices usually have billboards filled with cultural and leisure opportunities.
All 3 strategies above share a few important traits. First, they don't blatantly celebrate changes that may seem scandalous to a sizable (not necessarily majority, but numerous enough to disrupt socially) demographics. Second, they ensure that changes always come after buy-in: changes are applied to stakeholders, not "the people." The goal, as stated above, is to avoid rejection out of principles. Good ideas are only good if they are considered. Rubbing things, no matter how good, into people's face will get rebellion, not cooperation.
Thus, justice and liberty require a battle order. No one embrace outside invaders with open arms for long. No one like to see their identity and culture invalidated and held in contempt. No one fight for social and political orders to which they don't belong. Respect, buy-in, and shared progresses will help root progress. Lack of those, and progressives are at perpetual risk of beheading.
Saturday, February 13, 2016
Saturday, January 9, 2016
Reconsidering Ulysses S. Grant
Now that I am at the middle of the 2nd book on Civil War, I feel the need to defend Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant military record, especially against that of General Robert E. Lee, his chief opponent.
Ever since I first learned of American Civil War (and this was before my arrival at American shore), the War has been explained thus: the North won by the virtue of is superiority in finance, technologies, and manpower. After my arrival, this explanation was augmented by the assertion that the South (in particular, Army of Northern Virginia by Robert E. Lee) actually fought better and braver, but finally was crushed under the manpower of the North. A story of tragic heroes, really: the South claimed almost all of the "better" generals of the war, from "Stonewall" Jackson to Longstreet to Lee (not to count Johnston, Beauregard, and Bragg, whose fame predated the Civil War). Meanwhile, generalship of the North was, at best, hindering (stories of Burnside being burned on his side, anyone?) and at worst killed and maimed the seemingly inexhaustible stream of soldiers.
Comparison between Grant and Lee is particularly stark. Lee is widely considered to be a military genius, the beloved of the army, the hope of the Confederate and the fear of the Union. Meanwhile, Grant is generally viewed at the butcher of his own troops. Occasionally, people would "concede" things like "Grant was better at strategy; he directed an all-side attack on the Confederate" as excuses of why Lee lost. Even with those "concession," the only widely accepted reason of Lee's defeat revolved around the superiority in manpower and technologies and money of the Union. In other words, Grant contributed little (if anything beside carnage) to ultimate Union's victory.
The more I read about the Civil War, however, the less accurate this picture became. As of this point, I believe that the picture was a total lie. In fact, as I learn of the so-called "Lost Cause" of the Confederate, I am quite certain that such picture (the greatness of Lee and of the Southern military; the supposed clumsiness and bloodthirst of Grant and Northern government) was fabricated by apologists of white supremacy to excuse the South.
And I am here to clarify the story.
First, credit where credit due. Lee should not be held responsible for lack of strategy. One cannot say that Grant knew of overall strategy while Lee was ignorant. Grant was, after all, the general-in-chief of Union armies (note the plural form). Meanwhile, Lee was only command of Army of Northern Virginia. Furthermore, this position (general-in-chief of all armies) had existed within Union armies since the begin of the war. From Winfield Scott to McClellan to Halleck to Grant, Union side always had a professional general to direct their war effort. In contrast, another supposed military genius (who probably handed more victories to Grant than anyone else), Jefferson Davis, headed both civil and military command in the Confederate. So, stop scolding Lee for his "lack of strategic vision." It was not his job.
Second, another credit where credit due: Grant did not invent the multiple-front war. He merely continued it. There are 2 potential inventor of this ingenuity: Winfield Scott and Lincoln. In fact, the Union had fought on multiple fronts since the very beginning of the war. After all, the Union has absolute advantage in the sea, so Union's navy lent itself naturally to fighting in the back of the Confederate. Remember, New Orleans was captured while Grant was only a corp commander. Given that multiple general-in-chiefs came and went, credit belong to Lincoln for maintaining this strategy.
Right, now that those are out of the way (2 points above actually demean Grant), let's talk about the military career of Ulysses S. Grant. How was Grant as a tactician and strategist? Let's consider, say, battles of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson. Grant and Foote put Howe brothers (of the American Revolutionary War fame; they commanded the British army and navy) to shame. In fact, Fort Henry stood witness for how Grant was not a butcher: bombardment from the ships captured the fort without army's bloodshed. Similarly, the cooperation between navy and army proved decisive in forcing Fort Donelson to surrender. If Grant was so ignorant of tactics and so blood thirsty, he would have thrown his measly army at Fort Donelson for butchery.
Furthermore, Grant's ability was further proven with Vicksburg campaign. In fact, I maintain that this campaign outstripped Lee's exploits in term of tactics and strategy. Grant sneaked his army in between a larger force, broken down that force piece by piece. I know of only a few places where this happend: by Napoleon, by fiction, and in Chinese military textbooks. Even Hannibal should bow down to such daring and brilliant piece of strategy.
If Fort Henry and Vicksburg proved Grant's worth as a strategist, Shiloh (or Pittsburg Landing) and Wilderness proved his worth as tactician. The former (Shiloh) is particularly proving, especially in contrast to his opponent, the famous Albert Sidney Johnston. Where as Johnston acted like a colonel (he led a charge on his right wing while the commanding chain of his whole army disintegrated into chaos), Grant acted as the commanding general of the whole army. Grant remained in the center, moving troops as required, plugging holes and putting out fires. Then, when the morale sagged (even the unflabbable Sherman flinched and thought of retreating), Grant remained as cool as a cucumber. Coolness won out.
Now that we established Grant's capacity, let's talk about his manpower advantage. By 1964, the Confederate was in deep trouble. Always outmanned and outgunned, by 1964, the Confederate was cut into multiple pieces. In the West, the Union controlled Mississippi river, chopped off Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. In the deep south, Sherman would soon driver from Chattanooga down to Atlanta and the coast, cut off Alabama and Florida. This means that Lee could not marshal even the full power of the Confederate, and puts Army of Northern Virginia into serious disadvantage.
And who cut the Confederates into pieces? Ah, my man Major General Grant (when he freed Mississippi river, he was still Major General).
Thus, one can say that Grant created his own manpower and supply advantage. Now, to be fair, Union Navy's role in capturing New Orleans should also be given important credit, as well as Lincoln's strategy of envelopment. However, on land, without Grant and his victories in Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Vicksburg, Mississippi river would be blocked. Therefore, a lion share of credit for the shortage of power of the Army of Northern Virginia must go to Grant for his fine work in the west. And, remember, Grant trained Sherman in his way of war. Thus, he claimed a token of credit in the very deep south, too.
Another word on supply: Grant proved himself again here (and, to be fair, along with Halleck). His army, despite its various marvelous maneuvers, was never short of food, ammunition, and other supplies. Given that armies march on their stomach and fire their ammunition, supply chains play major role in war. Different from Lee (who operated within a few dozens of miles from his capital), Grant's army operated in far away field. Thus, Grant's ability to arrange supply for his troops was unparalleled, maybe even by George Washington himself.
As we see, Grant was a great general in his own rights. In fact, from his invention of Navy-Army joint operations at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, his brilliant maneuvers at Vicksburg, his excellent exploitation at Chattanooga, to his mastery over supply of food and ammunition, one can even argue that Grant outstripped Lee in commanding capacity. And, hey, he prevailed at the end, right? This, of course, is not to downplay Lee's brilliance. Lee was a great general (Johnston would bear witness), who was responsible for such a long existence of the Confederate. However, Grant, too, was a brilliant military commander. Yet everyone worships Lee while bashing Grant. How's that fair?
I have a few theories on the difference of treatment for the 2 equally brilliant commanders.
First was the carnage of 1864 and 1865. Too many men died. As McPherson pointed out in Battlecry of Freedom, by 1865, the Union army lost its drive due to the sheer amount of of turn over. And this turn over was from casualty. As the general-in-chief, Grant shouldered the blame for this. However, one must understand that there was frankly no other way. Grant and Lee were locked into this situation: there was about 100 miles between the Richmond and Washington DC; any, um, creative movement risked the other side breaking through. And breaking through meant lost of the national capital. Thus, frontal assault was required.
Second, Lee enjoyed a kind of sacred aura. It should be reminded that Lee's own grand victories (Seven Days battle, Chancellorsville, his 2 attempts to the North) cost many tens of thousands of casualties. And we have not counted the defeats (Gettysburg and the final campaign). In fact, Grant's greatest victories (beside 1864-1865 campaigns) cost way few casualties proportional to Lee's victories. However, Lee's aura of brilliance deflects this kind of analysis. People are content to say "yeah, Lee battled here and there and the Union armies were defeated," and not "well, Lee's men died by the thousands." True, Lee must do what he did. But so must Grant!
Thirdly, Lee's brilliance shined right in the most important theater: the hundred miles between the 2 capitals. Grant's awesome campaigns happened in the back water of the West. The history books (besides those talking about Grant specifically) would talk glowingly at length about Lee's exploits while giving 1-sentence summary of Grant's victories. Thus, Lee's brilliance is emphasized. And Grant?
Fourthly, the time of Grant in the limelight was the time of carnage. Grant arrived in Washington in 1864 and proceeded to start the bloody campaign for Richmond. Thus, talking about Grant means talking about the staggering blood of 1864 and 1865. In contrast with Lee's emphasize on brilliance, Grant got the emphasize on death and casualty.
Lastly, and I think this is the deciding factory, the "Lost Cause" movement of apologists in the South post-bellum. Those wanted to excuse their side while demonize the other. Grant, as the victorious general and the president of Reconstruction, was the must-aim target. Lee, as the model of Southern gentry, was the must-praise hero. And revisionists did their work. After those historical revision, Lee emerges as an angel while Grant sinks as butcher.
My opinion of Civil War is like this: the Union deserved to win. They fought for a worthy cause: the preservation of their country (sorry, but most of them were quite racist; emancipation was forced, not driven). The Confederation deserved to loses. For God's sake, they fought for their rights to enslave human beings! What kind of states fight for such sickening rights? And they was given an appropriate man for the job. Ulysses S. Grant was probably among the top 5 generals that this country ever has the honor to host. And we should appreciate that.
Ever since I first learned of American Civil War (and this was before my arrival at American shore), the War has been explained thus: the North won by the virtue of is superiority in finance, technologies, and manpower. After my arrival, this explanation was augmented by the assertion that the South (in particular, Army of Northern Virginia by Robert E. Lee) actually fought better and braver, but finally was crushed under the manpower of the North. A story of tragic heroes, really: the South claimed almost all of the "better" generals of the war, from "Stonewall" Jackson to Longstreet to Lee (not to count Johnston, Beauregard, and Bragg, whose fame predated the Civil War). Meanwhile, generalship of the North was, at best, hindering (stories of Burnside being burned on his side, anyone?) and at worst killed and maimed the seemingly inexhaustible stream of soldiers.
Comparison between Grant and Lee is particularly stark. Lee is widely considered to be a military genius, the beloved of the army, the hope of the Confederate and the fear of the Union. Meanwhile, Grant is generally viewed at the butcher of his own troops. Occasionally, people would "concede" things like "Grant was better at strategy; he directed an all-side attack on the Confederate" as excuses of why Lee lost. Even with those "concession," the only widely accepted reason of Lee's defeat revolved around the superiority in manpower and technologies and money of the Union. In other words, Grant contributed little (if anything beside carnage) to ultimate Union's victory.
The more I read about the Civil War, however, the less accurate this picture became. As of this point, I believe that the picture was a total lie. In fact, as I learn of the so-called "Lost Cause" of the Confederate, I am quite certain that such picture (the greatness of Lee and of the Southern military; the supposed clumsiness and bloodthirst of Grant and Northern government) was fabricated by apologists of white supremacy to excuse the South.
And I am here to clarify the story.
First, credit where credit due. Lee should not be held responsible for lack of strategy. One cannot say that Grant knew of overall strategy while Lee was ignorant. Grant was, after all, the general-in-chief of Union armies (note the plural form). Meanwhile, Lee was only command of Army of Northern Virginia. Furthermore, this position (general-in-chief of all armies) had existed within Union armies since the begin of the war. From Winfield Scott to McClellan to Halleck to Grant, Union side always had a professional general to direct their war effort. In contrast, another supposed military genius (who probably handed more victories to Grant than anyone else), Jefferson Davis, headed both civil and military command in the Confederate. So, stop scolding Lee for his "lack of strategic vision." It was not his job.
Second, another credit where credit due: Grant did not invent the multiple-front war. He merely continued it. There are 2 potential inventor of this ingenuity: Winfield Scott and Lincoln. In fact, the Union had fought on multiple fronts since the very beginning of the war. After all, the Union has absolute advantage in the sea, so Union's navy lent itself naturally to fighting in the back of the Confederate. Remember, New Orleans was captured while Grant was only a corp commander. Given that multiple general-in-chiefs came and went, credit belong to Lincoln for maintaining this strategy.
Right, now that those are out of the way (2 points above actually demean Grant), let's talk about the military career of Ulysses S. Grant. How was Grant as a tactician and strategist? Let's consider, say, battles of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson. Grant and Foote put Howe brothers (of the American Revolutionary War fame; they commanded the British army and navy) to shame. In fact, Fort Henry stood witness for how Grant was not a butcher: bombardment from the ships captured the fort without army's bloodshed. Similarly, the cooperation between navy and army proved decisive in forcing Fort Donelson to surrender. If Grant was so ignorant of tactics and so blood thirsty, he would have thrown his measly army at Fort Donelson for butchery.
Furthermore, Grant's ability was further proven with Vicksburg campaign. In fact, I maintain that this campaign outstripped Lee's exploits in term of tactics and strategy. Grant sneaked his army in between a larger force, broken down that force piece by piece. I know of only a few places where this happend: by Napoleon, by fiction, and in Chinese military textbooks. Even Hannibal should bow down to such daring and brilliant piece of strategy.
If Fort Henry and Vicksburg proved Grant's worth as a strategist, Shiloh (or Pittsburg Landing) and Wilderness proved his worth as tactician. The former (Shiloh) is particularly proving, especially in contrast to his opponent, the famous Albert Sidney Johnston. Where as Johnston acted like a colonel (he led a charge on his right wing while the commanding chain of his whole army disintegrated into chaos), Grant acted as the commanding general of the whole army. Grant remained in the center, moving troops as required, plugging holes and putting out fires. Then, when the morale sagged (even the unflabbable Sherman flinched and thought of retreating), Grant remained as cool as a cucumber. Coolness won out.
Now that we established Grant's capacity, let's talk about his manpower advantage. By 1964, the Confederate was in deep trouble. Always outmanned and outgunned, by 1964, the Confederate was cut into multiple pieces. In the West, the Union controlled Mississippi river, chopped off Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. In the deep south, Sherman would soon driver from Chattanooga down to Atlanta and the coast, cut off Alabama and Florida. This means that Lee could not marshal even the full power of the Confederate, and puts Army of Northern Virginia into serious disadvantage.
And who cut the Confederates into pieces? Ah, my man Major General Grant (when he freed Mississippi river, he was still Major General).
Thus, one can say that Grant created his own manpower and supply advantage. Now, to be fair, Union Navy's role in capturing New Orleans should also be given important credit, as well as Lincoln's strategy of envelopment. However, on land, without Grant and his victories in Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Vicksburg, Mississippi river would be blocked. Therefore, a lion share of credit for the shortage of power of the Army of Northern Virginia must go to Grant for his fine work in the west. And, remember, Grant trained Sherman in his way of war. Thus, he claimed a token of credit in the very deep south, too.
Another word on supply: Grant proved himself again here (and, to be fair, along with Halleck). His army, despite its various marvelous maneuvers, was never short of food, ammunition, and other supplies. Given that armies march on their stomach and fire their ammunition, supply chains play major role in war. Different from Lee (who operated within a few dozens of miles from his capital), Grant's army operated in far away field. Thus, Grant's ability to arrange supply for his troops was unparalleled, maybe even by George Washington himself.
As we see, Grant was a great general in his own rights. In fact, from his invention of Navy-Army joint operations at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, his brilliant maneuvers at Vicksburg, his excellent exploitation at Chattanooga, to his mastery over supply of food and ammunition, one can even argue that Grant outstripped Lee in commanding capacity. And, hey, he prevailed at the end, right? This, of course, is not to downplay Lee's brilliance. Lee was a great general (Johnston would bear witness), who was responsible for such a long existence of the Confederate. However, Grant, too, was a brilliant military commander. Yet everyone worships Lee while bashing Grant. How's that fair?
I have a few theories on the difference of treatment for the 2 equally brilliant commanders.
First was the carnage of 1864 and 1865. Too many men died. As McPherson pointed out in Battlecry of Freedom, by 1865, the Union army lost its drive due to the sheer amount of of turn over. And this turn over was from casualty. As the general-in-chief, Grant shouldered the blame for this. However, one must understand that there was frankly no other way. Grant and Lee were locked into this situation: there was about 100 miles between the Richmond and Washington DC; any, um, creative movement risked the other side breaking through. And breaking through meant lost of the national capital. Thus, frontal assault was required.
Second, Lee enjoyed a kind of sacred aura. It should be reminded that Lee's own grand victories (Seven Days battle, Chancellorsville, his 2 attempts to the North) cost many tens of thousands of casualties. And we have not counted the defeats (Gettysburg and the final campaign). In fact, Grant's greatest victories (beside 1864-1865 campaigns) cost way few casualties proportional to Lee's victories. However, Lee's aura of brilliance deflects this kind of analysis. People are content to say "yeah, Lee battled here and there and the Union armies were defeated," and not "well, Lee's men died by the thousands." True, Lee must do what he did. But so must Grant!
Thirdly, Lee's brilliance shined right in the most important theater: the hundred miles between the 2 capitals. Grant's awesome campaigns happened in the back water of the West. The history books (besides those talking about Grant specifically) would talk glowingly at length about Lee's exploits while giving 1-sentence summary of Grant's victories. Thus, Lee's brilliance is emphasized. And Grant?
Fourthly, the time of Grant in the limelight was the time of carnage. Grant arrived in Washington in 1864 and proceeded to start the bloody campaign for Richmond. Thus, talking about Grant means talking about the staggering blood of 1864 and 1865. In contrast with Lee's emphasize on brilliance, Grant got the emphasize on death and casualty.
Lastly, and I think this is the deciding factory, the "Lost Cause" movement of apologists in the South post-bellum. Those wanted to excuse their side while demonize the other. Grant, as the victorious general and the president of Reconstruction, was the must-aim target. Lee, as the model of Southern gentry, was the must-praise hero. And revisionists did their work. After those historical revision, Lee emerges as an angel while Grant sinks as butcher.
My opinion of Civil War is like this: the Union deserved to win. They fought for a worthy cause: the preservation of their country (sorry, but most of them were quite racist; emancipation was forced, not driven). The Confederation deserved to loses. For God's sake, they fought for their rights to enslave human beings! What kind of states fight for such sickening rights? And they was given an appropriate man for the job. Ulysses S. Grant was probably among the top 5 generals that this country ever has the honor to host. And we should appreciate that.
Sunday, December 20, 2015
Qualities of a Good Politicians
Previously, I have argued that principled is a bad quality in a politician. This leaves the question: what makes a good politician? What should one look for in a leader?
Before answering that question, we need to actually answer a more fundamental question: What do we want for politicians? Calling them "political leaders," we usually say that we want them to "lead." Then, we would relate to how, says, a CEO leads a company: by defining and articulating its vision, by taking initiative. To borrow from Christianity, we would imagine that our political leaders like shepherds, herding us toward a better world.
Well, except that most people would object to the whole politician-as-shepherd analogy above. In politics, most of us already have our own sets of principles. In fact, most of us even have policy preferences. A Democrat, for example, may want better welfare, more educational investment, more conservation, and peaceable approach to foreign policies; a Republican may want smaller government, national dignity, traditional family values, and lower taxes. Many of us may even champion specific policies.
Thus, we need no shepherd. Instead, we need agents of change. We want our politicians to make our principles a reality. Or, at the very least, working toward realization of our principles.
A politician quality depends on how well that politician realizes collective principles, dreams, and desires the people. Important (very important, in fact) disclaimer: this means that if the people want racism, terrorism, etc., a good politician will unleash such evils. Luckily, most human beings are, fundamentally, good. Furthermore, the job of teaching values do not belong to politicians. So, we are good there. Back to the topic: for politicians, good qualities are those that help the implementation of their people's wills.
So, what are those qualities.
First: engagement. Some synonyms: charisma, inspiring. Actions start with wills. Wills start will caring and engagement. Without engagement, there is no will; without will, there is no action; without action, countries collapse. The first, and most important job, of a politician is to engage the population, to make them believe in themselves, to instill empowerment in their hearts. Without this, nothing else happens.
Second: unity. Synonyms: empathy, public trust. What differentiate a community (be it a town, a state, or a nation) from an individual is sheer quantity. However, quantity is useless if the community tears itself into many small warring factions. This is the immediate cause of most state failures. For a community to mobilize its force to bear on its challenges, the people must unite; they must trust each other; they must feel for each other. The leaders of the community must foster this unity, or else the community will remain a sand castle: collapse at first wave. To solve big problems, to defend dignity, to make its principles walk on this earth, a community must unite. And it's the politicians job to ensure this unity.
Third: communication. There are 2 sides to communication: to the people and from the people. The former includes analysis of the situation, explanation of choices, and report of progress; the latter includes composition of public will, translation of will to concrete policies, and resolve of grievances. Communication coordinates collective actions; without it, the mass people would spend more time stepping on each other toes than getting things done. Public communication poses 2 major challenges: one, there are a lot of people (anywhere from a few millions to 1.5 billions); two, the policy choices are generally complex (quick, should interest rate be 1.5% or 1.75%?) and the people generally don't have time (people have full-time jobs to do, you know). The politicians, as agents of change, must facilitate this. First, they must bridge between people and communities so that millions can share ideas; second, they must simplify the issues and do the research on the behalf of their people.
Forth: transparency. We talked about trust between citizens above. Now, let's talk about trust between citizens and their governments. Without trust between citizens and governments, the people won't let the politicians to lead, to bridge, to speak and act on their behalves. And how to build this trust? Its basis is transparency.
Fifth: loyalty and bravery. If trust opens the door for citizenship activism, patriotism and loyalty drive the citizens into the door. However, those are 2-way streets: for citizens to fight for their countries, their leaders must first fight for them. Loyalty and bravery from politicians give the citizens the fuzzy feeling that let them charge onto Normandy beach heads, or to sip coffee while bombs and bullets whizzed by.
Engagement, unity, communication, transparency, and loyalty. A good politician must have these 5 characters, at least to some degree. Absence (or, even a very low level) of any of these spells disaster. Well, maybe not disaster. I would not expect a dorky (i.e. non-engaging, very uncharistmatic) to go far. However, if a person without the 5 grabs power, one must sunder for the poor country (or, probably the stupid country) led by such person.
Before answering that question, we need to actually answer a more fundamental question: What do we want for politicians? Calling them "political leaders," we usually say that we want them to "lead." Then, we would relate to how, says, a CEO leads a company: by defining and articulating its vision, by taking initiative. To borrow from Christianity, we would imagine that our political leaders like shepherds, herding us toward a better world.
Well, except that most people would object to the whole politician-as-shepherd analogy above. In politics, most of us already have our own sets of principles. In fact, most of us even have policy preferences. A Democrat, for example, may want better welfare, more educational investment, more conservation, and peaceable approach to foreign policies; a Republican may want smaller government, national dignity, traditional family values, and lower taxes. Many of us may even champion specific policies.
Thus, we need no shepherd. Instead, we need agents of change. We want our politicians to make our principles a reality. Or, at the very least, working toward realization of our principles.
A politician quality depends on how well that politician realizes collective principles, dreams, and desires the people. Important (very important, in fact) disclaimer: this means that if the people want racism, terrorism, etc., a good politician will unleash such evils. Luckily, most human beings are, fundamentally, good. Furthermore, the job of teaching values do not belong to politicians. So, we are good there. Back to the topic: for politicians, good qualities are those that help the implementation of their people's wills.
So, what are those qualities.
First: engagement. Some synonyms: charisma, inspiring. Actions start with wills. Wills start will caring and engagement. Without engagement, there is no will; without will, there is no action; without action, countries collapse. The first, and most important job, of a politician is to engage the population, to make them believe in themselves, to instill empowerment in their hearts. Without this, nothing else happens.
Second: unity. Synonyms: empathy, public trust. What differentiate a community (be it a town, a state, or a nation) from an individual is sheer quantity. However, quantity is useless if the community tears itself into many small warring factions. This is the immediate cause of most state failures. For a community to mobilize its force to bear on its challenges, the people must unite; they must trust each other; they must feel for each other. The leaders of the community must foster this unity, or else the community will remain a sand castle: collapse at first wave. To solve big problems, to defend dignity, to make its principles walk on this earth, a community must unite. And it's the politicians job to ensure this unity.
Third: communication. There are 2 sides to communication: to the people and from the people. The former includes analysis of the situation, explanation of choices, and report of progress; the latter includes composition of public will, translation of will to concrete policies, and resolve of grievances. Communication coordinates collective actions; without it, the mass people would spend more time stepping on each other toes than getting things done. Public communication poses 2 major challenges: one, there are a lot of people (anywhere from a few millions to 1.5 billions); two, the policy choices are generally complex (quick, should interest rate be 1.5% or 1.75%?) and the people generally don't have time (people have full-time jobs to do, you know). The politicians, as agents of change, must facilitate this. First, they must bridge between people and communities so that millions can share ideas; second, they must simplify the issues and do the research on the behalf of their people.
Forth: transparency. We talked about trust between citizens above. Now, let's talk about trust between citizens and their governments. Without trust between citizens and governments, the people won't let the politicians to lead, to bridge, to speak and act on their behalves. And how to build this trust? Its basis is transparency.
Fifth: loyalty and bravery. If trust opens the door for citizenship activism, patriotism and loyalty drive the citizens into the door. However, those are 2-way streets: for citizens to fight for their countries, their leaders must first fight for them. Loyalty and bravery from politicians give the citizens the fuzzy feeling that let them charge onto Normandy beach heads, or to sip coffee while bombs and bullets whizzed by.
Engagement, unity, communication, transparency, and loyalty. A good politician must have these 5 characters, at least to some degree. Absence (or, even a very low level) of any of these spells disaster. Well, maybe not disaster. I would not expect a dorky (i.e. non-engaging, very uncharistmatic) to go far. However, if a person without the 5 grabs power, one must sunder for the poor country (or, probably the stupid country) led by such person.
Tuesday, November 24, 2015
Principled, or, The Worst Quality of a Politician
I know of a truly principled leader. His name is Adolf Hitler. In pursuing his principle, i.e. the purging of undesirables, he diverted military resources into their gathering and killing. These very resources were, more or less, exactly what German army needed to capture Moscow before Russian winter befell upon them. After that, all was history.
I know of a truly unprincipled leader. His name is Abraham Lincoln. Elected by radicals wanting the end of slavery, he made one concession after another to please the border states into staying in the Union. Over and over, he repeated that his war fought for union of the states, not end of state rights or slavery. Obviously, like any unprincipled person, he changed his tone when the situation asked for such change: midway through the war, he proclaimed the emancipation of the slaves.
These days, when people speak of good politicians, or "statesmen" (sorry, ladies, history has spoken, and it's quite sexist until last century), they speak of principles and sticking to those. From right to left, people are calling upon their leaders to stick to their principles, to refuse compromises. To refuse the approach of others shows strength, they say, and to compromise is spineless. And, obviously, the government promptly grinds to a stop. Funny enough, then people blame lack of principle for this failure to govern.
Who are the most principled leaders? The tyrants, the dictators, the despots. After all, what is "principled" anyway? Isn't it to do whatever you want (that is, you believe in) regardless of opposition? When a leader decides upon only his own preferences, what do you call such leader? Tyranny.
Frankly, when people speak of "principles," people actually ask for something else. People ask for their leaders to make the right calls, especially when oppositions are wrong. Here is the catch: how do you know what is right and wrong? Take Holy Roman Empire. When Charles V pursued his role as Catholic emperor, he drove his empire and kingdom into the greatest power of Europe; when Ferdinand II pursued the same thing, he drove his empire into Thirty Years War and degradation. Take Germany (or, more precisely, Prussia). When Frederick II (Frederick the Great) positioned his kingdom in the middle of a massive dual-front war, he held out long enough for his enemies to disintegrate, gained Silesia for his kingdom and forever glory for his military skills; when Wilhelm II positioned his empire in the middle of a massive war, Germany was defeated, her youth was slaughtered, her industrial lands and colonies were pawned to France and England.
Humans are not God. Situations are not frozen. Events are not static. To err is to human. Last time I check, all politicians, good, bad, or middle ground, have not attained omnipotence yet. Thus, they will, from time to time, hold the wrong beliefs. To hang onto those beliefs, to refuse reconsideration of policies, to close ears to opposition will, sooner or later, bring about disasters.
Therefore, principled is the (one would argue, defining) quality of tyrants, of dictators, of despots. A good politician must avoid it. Now, given that a good politician must also act well, such politician will probably do well to conceal his avoidance of principles. Oh well, such is life.
I know of a truly unprincipled leader. His name is Abraham Lincoln. Elected by radicals wanting the end of slavery, he made one concession after another to please the border states into staying in the Union. Over and over, he repeated that his war fought for union of the states, not end of state rights or slavery. Obviously, like any unprincipled person, he changed his tone when the situation asked for such change: midway through the war, he proclaimed the emancipation of the slaves.
These days, when people speak of good politicians, or "statesmen" (sorry, ladies, history has spoken, and it's quite sexist until last century), they speak of principles and sticking to those. From right to left, people are calling upon their leaders to stick to their principles, to refuse compromises. To refuse the approach of others shows strength, they say, and to compromise is spineless. And, obviously, the government promptly grinds to a stop. Funny enough, then people blame lack of principle for this failure to govern.
Who are the most principled leaders? The tyrants, the dictators, the despots. After all, what is "principled" anyway? Isn't it to do whatever you want (that is, you believe in) regardless of opposition? When a leader decides upon only his own preferences, what do you call such leader? Tyranny.
Frankly, when people speak of "principles," people actually ask for something else. People ask for their leaders to make the right calls, especially when oppositions are wrong. Here is the catch: how do you know what is right and wrong? Take Holy Roman Empire. When Charles V pursued his role as Catholic emperor, he drove his empire and kingdom into the greatest power of Europe; when Ferdinand II pursued the same thing, he drove his empire into Thirty Years War and degradation. Take Germany (or, more precisely, Prussia). When Frederick II (Frederick the Great) positioned his kingdom in the middle of a massive dual-front war, he held out long enough for his enemies to disintegrate, gained Silesia for his kingdom and forever glory for his military skills; when Wilhelm II positioned his empire in the middle of a massive war, Germany was defeated, her youth was slaughtered, her industrial lands and colonies were pawned to France and England.
Humans are not God. Situations are not frozen. Events are not static. To err is to human. Last time I check, all politicians, good, bad, or middle ground, have not attained omnipotence yet. Thus, they will, from time to time, hold the wrong beliefs. To hang onto those beliefs, to refuse reconsideration of policies, to close ears to opposition will, sooner or later, bring about disasters.
Therefore, principled is the (one would argue, defining) quality of tyrants, of dictators, of despots. A good politician must avoid it. Now, given that a good politician must also act well, such politician will probably do well to conceal his avoidance of principles. Oh well, such is life.
Sunday, November 22, 2015
The Stupidity of Hating The Government
One of the defining feature of American politics, I believe, is how much people dislike or outright hate "The Government." Why the quotation marks and capitalization? Well, because people don't even seem to know what they hate exactly. They just hate "The Government." It oppresses them, steals from them, coerces them, spies on them, carries out immoral and inexcusable deeds. Then, depends on where a person stands in the political scales, The Government seems to do very different things. A right-winger would complain about how The Government takes away will to work, feeds lazy people, oppresses freedom of the church. A left-winger would complain that The Government fails to help poor people, gives to the corporations, and enslaves itself to the church. Notice that contradicting people generally accuse The Government of doing exactly what the other part would do.
It's my opinion that both sides, left and right, are frankly outright stupid.
First, let's say that The Government is overthrown. Yoo hoo! FREEDOM! Let's take a few days to celebrate. Now what? Do laws need adjustment and execution? Do streets need policing? Do fire need fighting? Do rights need protection? By the way, property is a right, so if you want it, you have to protect it. You know what's state of nature? The tiger eats the rabbits; that's law of nature. The queen bees order their workers around; that's law of nature. Life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, property, equality, etc. are all artificial constructs. So, don't tell me shit about natural rights. If you want rights, you protect it.
Again, what will make and execute laws? Police the streets? Fight the fire? Protect human rights? Bad guys don't magically turn into bunnies after a revolution. Hunger does not magically turn into feasts after a revolution. Enemies don't magically befriend after a revolution. What will do all the public works and coordinations?
Oh yes, a new government will. New government may do things differently from old one, no doubt. However, it must exist. Until all humans become saints (or, maybe until robots can replace all or most of human labor), something still need to maintain laws and orders, coordinate public works, and facilitate public discussions. What do you call that thing? Ah, the be-damned government.
Secondly, what do you think the government can do? And I am serious about this. If a land has 10ft of rain a year, a government can't make it rains 20ft. If crop fails, the government can't make it spring back to life. The government actually can't create any wealth. The government, by definition, governs. That means that it sets up the society to function. It can't make rain out of drought, land out of flood, gold out of lead, food out of dirt. It just can't.
Thus, overthrowing or replacing a government does not solve the scarcity of goods and wealth. If anything, such attempts will destroy trust, infrastructure, and wealth to such a degree that the attempted country would fall far behind its neighbor. Exhibit A: France and England. France is a bigger, more populous, and was richer than England. However, French Revolution made English Revolution look like child play. Guess who came out ahead? Hint: vast majority of developed "new world" countries (the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) speak English.
In other words, the government is a necessity, but is far from omnipotent. It's a social construct, just like, says, nations and churches and universities. Thus, to hate "The Government" is like hating the foxes for killing the chickens. It's just stupid.
That said, hating specific aspects or actions of the current government makes sense. All governments are far from perfect. Thus, by identifying problem areas, citizens can improve their governments and make their world a fairer place. Remember, a lot can be done without a bloody revolution. In fact, many a times, revolutions change little. Just ask the Chinese. Since the time of their unification, some 2300 years ago, their land has witnessed countless revolutions and rebellions. Guess what, up until quite recently (1905), there have been preciously little change in political situations. Reversely, the US, over slightly more than 200 years of her existence, has change enormously. Sure, there has been a bloody civil war, but what countries have not experienced that? (Hmm, maybe Canada; time to accuse Canada of not being a real country). However, the US today and the US in 1960s and the US in 1930s and the US in 1870s are vastly different places, and not just in term of economic growth. Today, a black man presides over the country. Such situation is not imaginable, let alone possible, when the Civil War ended (in fact, the Union is quite racist; as a reminder, they did not fight for the slave per se). Today, homosexual couples can marry. Today, children don't have to work to death to feed their family. Today, most people work only 40 hours a week. All of the above were achieved without major bloodshed.
Therefore, next time you say "I hate the government," be specific. You hate the support to poor children? Sure, then let poor children die. Or, you hate jobs from defense industry? Sure, let people go unemployed. You hate the fact that poor women can get abortion? Sure, let crime run wild. Note that I only list the worst consequences above. All of these consequences can be remedied, if you work on them. They don't magically disappear if you impeach your president. They definitely don't disappear just because you slaughter your fellow citizens in a revolution. So, fix the government if you has issues; don't let a few bad apples ruin your harvest.
It's my opinion that both sides, left and right, are frankly outright stupid.
First, let's say that The Government is overthrown. Yoo hoo! FREEDOM! Let's take a few days to celebrate. Now what? Do laws need adjustment and execution? Do streets need policing? Do fire need fighting? Do rights need protection? By the way, property is a right, so if you want it, you have to protect it. You know what's state of nature? The tiger eats the rabbits; that's law of nature. The queen bees order their workers around; that's law of nature. Life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, property, equality, etc. are all artificial constructs. So, don't tell me shit about natural rights. If you want rights, you protect it.
Again, what will make and execute laws? Police the streets? Fight the fire? Protect human rights? Bad guys don't magically turn into bunnies after a revolution. Hunger does not magically turn into feasts after a revolution. Enemies don't magically befriend after a revolution. What will do all the public works and coordinations?
Oh yes, a new government will. New government may do things differently from old one, no doubt. However, it must exist. Until all humans become saints (or, maybe until robots can replace all or most of human labor), something still need to maintain laws and orders, coordinate public works, and facilitate public discussions. What do you call that thing? Ah, the be-damned government.
Secondly, what do you think the government can do? And I am serious about this. If a land has 10ft of rain a year, a government can't make it rains 20ft. If crop fails, the government can't make it spring back to life. The government actually can't create any wealth. The government, by definition, governs. That means that it sets up the society to function. It can't make rain out of drought, land out of flood, gold out of lead, food out of dirt. It just can't.
Thus, overthrowing or replacing a government does not solve the scarcity of goods and wealth. If anything, such attempts will destroy trust, infrastructure, and wealth to such a degree that the attempted country would fall far behind its neighbor. Exhibit A: France and England. France is a bigger, more populous, and was richer than England. However, French Revolution made English Revolution look like child play. Guess who came out ahead? Hint: vast majority of developed "new world" countries (the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) speak English.
In other words, the government is a necessity, but is far from omnipotent. It's a social construct, just like, says, nations and churches and universities. Thus, to hate "The Government" is like hating the foxes for killing the chickens. It's just stupid.
That said, hating specific aspects or actions of the current government makes sense. All governments are far from perfect. Thus, by identifying problem areas, citizens can improve their governments and make their world a fairer place. Remember, a lot can be done without a bloody revolution. In fact, many a times, revolutions change little. Just ask the Chinese. Since the time of their unification, some 2300 years ago, their land has witnessed countless revolutions and rebellions. Guess what, up until quite recently (1905), there have been preciously little change in political situations. Reversely, the US, over slightly more than 200 years of her existence, has change enormously. Sure, there has been a bloody civil war, but what countries have not experienced that? (Hmm, maybe Canada; time to accuse Canada of not being a real country). However, the US today and the US in 1960s and the US in 1930s and the US in 1870s are vastly different places, and not just in term of economic growth. Today, a black man presides over the country. Such situation is not imaginable, let alone possible, when the Civil War ended (in fact, the Union is quite racist; as a reminder, they did not fight for the slave per se). Today, homosexual couples can marry. Today, children don't have to work to death to feed their family. Today, most people work only 40 hours a week. All of the above were achieved without major bloodshed.
Therefore, next time you say "I hate the government," be specific. You hate the support to poor children? Sure, then let poor children die. Or, you hate jobs from defense industry? Sure, let people go unemployed. You hate the fact that poor women can get abortion? Sure, let crime run wild. Note that I only list the worst consequences above. All of these consequences can be remedied, if you work on them. They don't magically disappear if you impeach your president. They definitely don't disappear just because you slaughter your fellow citizens in a revolution. So, fix the government if you has issues; don't let a few bad apples ruin your harvest.
Terrorism and Poverty
First thing first, my deepest condolences to France and her people. My heart is with them in this trial time.
In the wake of such terrorism, let's talk about what breeds such thoughts and actors. Hopefully, let's also talk about how to discourage such thoughts and prevent such actions.
It has been asserted, over and over, that terrorists themselves are not from dire situations. Many of them are from well-off, if not outright wealthy, families; many of them are exquisitely educated. This assertion has appeared over and over, as a mysterious puzzle over why such well-to-do people join such organizations and commit such action.
In fact, this reminds me of a related, but much more obviously racist puzzle: both indigenous Australians and Whites occupy Oceania. However, the former lived for thousands of years as hunter-gatherers, with barely any artifact to show; meanwhile, the latter, in the span of a few centuries, created a modern, literate, and very productive society. This would, naturally, lead to an assertion of how Whites are superior to those "missing links" between chimpanzees and humans. It's almost laughable, except that it caused deaths of millions; genocides are never laughing matters.
The whole assertion about the supposed divorce of poverty and terrorism, in my opinion, attempts to guide people toward such racist (well, this is discrimination based on religion, so religist?) conclusions. After all, well-to-do Christians don't seem to go around blowing up innocent people, right? Ergo, this must mean that Islam is bad.
Obviously, like all thoughtful deception, this lovely misdirection fails to cover quite a few glaring very strange behaviors.
First and foremost is this: if the problem is with Islam, why do those Muslims bother to travel all the way to the impoverished areas to organize? Seriously. There are sizable Muslim populations everywhere. Why not just setup an attack right from the belly of the enemies? Why bother traveling, with so many difficulties and risks, to Syria and Iraq and such?
Secondly, why do (organized) extremism only seem to flourish in impoverished areas? I mean, sure, the terrorists strike Western world here and there. However, the vast majority of them are from Africa and Middle East. Even within the US, the most obvious extremist groups can be found in poorer areas, i.e. the rural and the South. They may strike their neighbors, but they never seem to take root there.
Both of the points above can circle to this: the individual terrorists (especially the leading ones) may be well-to-do, but the environments that foster them are always poor. This is the clearest link between terrorism and poverty.
The question becomes: if poverty does not furnish terrorists (at least not exclusively), why do terrorism still require poverty to thrive?
Now, let's talk about people in general. Generally speaking, people are quite decent. They may do wrong, but, generally speaking, they know wrongness, and they either restrain or cover it up. It's call common decency, you know. And, a part of dignity is to uphold such decency.
Terrorists don't seem to have such decency. Or, at least, their decency is extremely low. As such, should persons be among normal (as in, not desperate) people, generally speaking, two things happen. Either decent people convert them over, or they destroy the decent people. The former case results in the millions (if not hundreds of millions) of people low in empathy but nevertheless non-violent and upholding social standards. The latter case, obviously, goes kaput.
But what if terrorist mindset meets with poverty and constant social unrest? Such situations fail the people, render them desperate. Desperate people bend much easier and are more open-minded to alternative social arrangement. Now, terrorists have 2 new choices: they terrorize the weak and court the strong. Weakened by hunger, split by internal struggles, stricken down by calamities to themselves and their close ones, people in such situation may be bullied into submission. Meanwhile, some of them may even support the cause of terror. After all, what have social standards and common sense done for them? And, remember, terrorists always blame it on others. If others have wronged you, what decency do you owe to them?
And thus, poverty provides the environment for terrorist seeds to grow. The seed may come from wealth, but it needs poverty to sprout.
How can we solve this problem, then?
Confucius once instructed 3 steps to grow a people: first, gather them; second, make them rich; third, teach them common sense. This order should be upheld strictly.
Here is my opinion on Afghanistan and Iraq situations: US invaded the 2 countries, hold political power over them, and I have yet to see their products anywhere. In fact, for progress, we occasionally hear of their "social progress," most notably women rights. And such is a recipe for disaster.
Now, I don't mean to belittle women rights. They are important. However, let's look at the situation from a poor man perspective, and I mean literally poor man. He sees his lot of life changes little; he still lives in poverty. Worse yet, previously, at least he once debased himself in front of his own people; now he debases himself in front of people of different countries and races. Where is his dignity now? Worse yet, his known world order was turned upside down. Women now parade over his head. And he got none of them (remember, we are talking about societies where women were considered as property to men). All he sees, thus, is lots of changes, uncertainty, shame, and quite little prospect of betterment. Lastly, the little betterment he enjoys may not mean that much. After all, when you are hungry, homeless, illiterate, what good does election do?
When a significant chunk of the population are impoverished and insulted (by the invasion of their country, obviously), one can't exactly blaming them for exploring alternative arrangements. Unfortunately, among those arrangements are racism, sexism, militarism, and whatever-discrimation-based-on-religion-calls. What do you get when you combine all of these above?
Remember Confucius' sequence: gather people, give them wealth, then teach them decency. Decency fights terrorism. Wealth (i.e. financial and food security) nourishes both decency and will-power. Without wealth, without food, without shelters, don't talk about social progress.
In the wake of such terrorism, let's talk about what breeds such thoughts and actors. Hopefully, let's also talk about how to discourage such thoughts and prevent such actions.
It has been asserted, over and over, that terrorists themselves are not from dire situations. Many of them are from well-off, if not outright wealthy, families; many of them are exquisitely educated. This assertion has appeared over and over, as a mysterious puzzle over why such well-to-do people join such organizations and commit such action.
In fact, this reminds me of a related, but much more obviously racist puzzle: both indigenous Australians and Whites occupy Oceania. However, the former lived for thousands of years as hunter-gatherers, with barely any artifact to show; meanwhile, the latter, in the span of a few centuries, created a modern, literate, and very productive society. This would, naturally, lead to an assertion of how Whites are superior to those "missing links" between chimpanzees and humans. It's almost laughable, except that it caused deaths of millions; genocides are never laughing matters.
The whole assertion about the supposed divorce of poverty and terrorism, in my opinion, attempts to guide people toward such racist (well, this is discrimination based on religion, so religist?) conclusions. After all, well-to-do Christians don't seem to go around blowing up innocent people, right? Ergo, this must mean that Islam is bad.
Obviously, like all thoughtful deception, this lovely misdirection fails to cover quite a few glaring very strange behaviors.
First and foremost is this: if the problem is with Islam, why do those Muslims bother to travel all the way to the impoverished areas to organize? Seriously. There are sizable Muslim populations everywhere. Why not just setup an attack right from the belly of the enemies? Why bother traveling, with so many difficulties and risks, to Syria and Iraq and such?
Secondly, why do (organized) extremism only seem to flourish in impoverished areas? I mean, sure, the terrorists strike Western world here and there. However, the vast majority of them are from Africa and Middle East. Even within the US, the most obvious extremist groups can be found in poorer areas, i.e. the rural and the South. They may strike their neighbors, but they never seem to take root there.
Both of the points above can circle to this: the individual terrorists (especially the leading ones) may be well-to-do, but the environments that foster them are always poor. This is the clearest link between terrorism and poverty.
The question becomes: if poverty does not furnish terrorists (at least not exclusively), why do terrorism still require poverty to thrive?
Now, let's talk about people in general. Generally speaking, people are quite decent. They may do wrong, but, generally speaking, they know wrongness, and they either restrain or cover it up. It's call common decency, you know. And, a part of dignity is to uphold such decency.
Terrorists don't seem to have such decency. Or, at least, their decency is extremely low. As such, should persons be among normal (as in, not desperate) people, generally speaking, two things happen. Either decent people convert them over, or they destroy the decent people. The former case results in the millions (if not hundreds of millions) of people low in empathy but nevertheless non-violent and upholding social standards. The latter case, obviously, goes kaput.
But what if terrorist mindset meets with poverty and constant social unrest? Such situations fail the people, render them desperate. Desperate people bend much easier and are more open-minded to alternative social arrangement. Now, terrorists have 2 new choices: they terrorize the weak and court the strong. Weakened by hunger, split by internal struggles, stricken down by calamities to themselves and their close ones, people in such situation may be bullied into submission. Meanwhile, some of them may even support the cause of terror. After all, what have social standards and common sense done for them? And, remember, terrorists always blame it on others. If others have wronged you, what decency do you owe to them?
And thus, poverty provides the environment for terrorist seeds to grow. The seed may come from wealth, but it needs poverty to sprout.
How can we solve this problem, then?
Confucius once instructed 3 steps to grow a people: first, gather them; second, make them rich; third, teach them common sense. This order should be upheld strictly.
Here is my opinion on Afghanistan and Iraq situations: US invaded the 2 countries, hold political power over them, and I have yet to see their products anywhere. In fact, for progress, we occasionally hear of their "social progress," most notably women rights. And such is a recipe for disaster.
Now, I don't mean to belittle women rights. They are important. However, let's look at the situation from a poor man perspective, and I mean literally poor man. He sees his lot of life changes little; he still lives in poverty. Worse yet, previously, at least he once debased himself in front of his own people; now he debases himself in front of people of different countries and races. Where is his dignity now? Worse yet, his known world order was turned upside down. Women now parade over his head. And he got none of them (remember, we are talking about societies where women were considered as property to men). All he sees, thus, is lots of changes, uncertainty, shame, and quite little prospect of betterment. Lastly, the little betterment he enjoys may not mean that much. After all, when you are hungry, homeless, illiterate, what good does election do?
When a significant chunk of the population are impoverished and insulted (by the invasion of their country, obviously), one can't exactly blaming them for exploring alternative arrangements. Unfortunately, among those arrangements are racism, sexism, militarism, and whatever-discrimation-based-on-religion-calls. What do you get when you combine all of these above?
Remember Confucius' sequence: gather people, give them wealth, then teach them decency. Decency fights terrorism. Wealth (i.e. financial and food security) nourishes both decency and will-power. Without wealth, without food, without shelters, don't talk about social progress.
Tuesday, November 10, 2015
The Point of Democratic Government
As I slowly make my way through A People's History of the United States, the book keeps intoning an idea that, frankly, annoys the heck out of me. The idea this this: (democratic) election siphons revolutionary energy away from the oppressed people into the system.
Well, let's look at things the other way around. No government stands without at least some tolerance of its people. To give credo to the social contract idea, at some level, the population must consent that the current regime is acceptable. Generally, "acceptable" is a balance between oppression by the current regime and the blood and resources spilled for a new regime. When a significant enough faction of the population consider their government to be unacceptable, they can and do revolt to establish a new government.
Such is the democratic basis of undemocratic regimes. The people vote by their blood, with roughly 2 choices: to revolt or to endure.
Democratic government gives a new choice. A discontent people (which is to say, all people) have a new channel of expressing their discontentment: through actual voting. Well, generally speaking, a requirement for "democracy" is also freedom of speech, assembly, and of the press. So, a democratic regime allows multiple forms of opinion expression. In fact, with enough determination, a population can, and did, change its population quite dramatically over time without much blood shed.
Remember this: no regimes go away peacefully. At least, none that I know of, including Meiji Revolution. Each regime starts with a reign of terror (against old regime) and ends with a reign of terror (against the upcoming one). Some regimes (French First Republic, says) actually include periods explicitly named "Reign of Terror." Thus, a regime may kill off some of its oppressed citizens (intentionally or through negligence), those are pocket change compared to the mass killing that surely accompanies any change.
More disturbingly, revolutions don't necessarily result in improvement. In fact, most of them merely replace one group of rulers with another, or in fact degrade the status quo. With the risk of overly relying on French Revolution, let's consider its outcome. The revolution started against taxation and tyranny. It resulted in, gasp, an empire! And I am not sure if the First Republic was that good either: half of it is called "Reign of Terror." Numerous revolutions end this way. Think about Egypt during Arab Spring: its Twitter and Facebook wielding population ousted a dictator, then proceeded to elect Muslim Brotherhood, an alleged terrorist organization. Or think about assassination of Caesar (just to be clear, that assassination is merely a coup, which is much less bloody than a full-blown revolution).
Lastly, even if a revolution succeeds, its result have severe upper limits. More sadly, those limits are probably quite close to those of the old regime. Let's take French Fifth Republic (France is a fascinating historic case). For all intends and purposes, it is the ideal revolutionary: not that much blood, and the government was formed relatively quickly. And yet, when you think about it, France still experiences poverty, joblessness, and so on. After all, when you think about it, the regime may change, but most other things remain the same. If the country consists mostly of desert, it still can't feed itself after a revolutionary. If the people have been evading taxes, they probably would continue to evade taxes after a revolution. The government, after all, is not God. It can only rearrange, not make miracles.
Thus, the whole point of democracy is to avoid bloody revolutions. Democracy ideally fosters peaceful communication and problem solving so that the people don't need to vote with their blood.
To complain that democracy siphons revolutionary fervor is like to complain that wolves are cruel to deer. Sorry, dear, but that's the whole point. Revolutionary fervor probably drags millions to the graves with an uncertain future. Can a 50% chance of a hopefully better government be worth the blood and suffering of a revolutionary? Obviously, I am very generous here. History suggests that the chance is probably much lower. Can 10% chance of a slightly better government justify such sacrifice?
Well, let's look at things the other way around. No government stands without at least some tolerance of its people. To give credo to the social contract idea, at some level, the population must consent that the current regime is acceptable. Generally, "acceptable" is a balance between oppression by the current regime and the blood and resources spilled for a new regime. When a significant enough faction of the population consider their government to be unacceptable, they can and do revolt to establish a new government.
Such is the democratic basis of undemocratic regimes. The people vote by their blood, with roughly 2 choices: to revolt or to endure.
Democratic government gives a new choice. A discontent people (which is to say, all people) have a new channel of expressing their discontentment: through actual voting. Well, generally speaking, a requirement for "democracy" is also freedom of speech, assembly, and of the press. So, a democratic regime allows multiple forms of opinion expression. In fact, with enough determination, a population can, and did, change its population quite dramatically over time without much blood shed.
Remember this: no regimes go away peacefully. At least, none that I know of, including Meiji Revolution. Each regime starts with a reign of terror (against old regime) and ends with a reign of terror (against the upcoming one). Some regimes (French First Republic, says) actually include periods explicitly named "Reign of Terror." Thus, a regime may kill off some of its oppressed citizens (intentionally or through negligence), those are pocket change compared to the mass killing that surely accompanies any change.
More disturbingly, revolutions don't necessarily result in improvement. In fact, most of them merely replace one group of rulers with another, or in fact degrade the status quo. With the risk of overly relying on French Revolution, let's consider its outcome. The revolution started against taxation and tyranny. It resulted in, gasp, an empire! And I am not sure if the First Republic was that good either: half of it is called "Reign of Terror." Numerous revolutions end this way. Think about Egypt during Arab Spring: its Twitter and Facebook wielding population ousted a dictator, then proceeded to elect Muslim Brotherhood, an alleged terrorist organization. Or think about assassination of Caesar (just to be clear, that assassination is merely a coup, which is much less bloody than a full-blown revolution).
Lastly, even if a revolution succeeds, its result have severe upper limits. More sadly, those limits are probably quite close to those of the old regime. Let's take French Fifth Republic (France is a fascinating historic case). For all intends and purposes, it is the ideal revolutionary: not that much blood, and the government was formed relatively quickly. And yet, when you think about it, France still experiences poverty, joblessness, and so on. After all, when you think about it, the regime may change, but most other things remain the same. If the country consists mostly of desert, it still can't feed itself after a revolutionary. If the people have been evading taxes, they probably would continue to evade taxes after a revolution. The government, after all, is not God. It can only rearrange, not make miracles.
Thus, the whole point of democracy is to avoid bloody revolutions. Democracy ideally fosters peaceful communication and problem solving so that the people don't need to vote with their blood.
To complain that democracy siphons revolutionary fervor is like to complain that wolves are cruel to deer. Sorry, dear, but that's the whole point. Revolutionary fervor probably drags millions to the graves with an uncertain future. Can a 50% chance of a hopefully better government be worth the blood and suffering of a revolutionary? Obviously, I am very generous here. History suggests that the chance is probably much lower. Can 10% chance of a slightly better government justify such sacrifice?
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