Reconsidering Ulysses S. Grant

Now that I am at the middle of the 2nd book on Civil War, I feel the need to defend Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant military record, especially against that of General Robert E. Lee, his chief opponent.

Ever since I first learned of American Civil War (and this was before my arrival at American shore), the War has been explained thus: the North won by the virtue of is superiority in finance, technologies, and manpower. After my arrival, this explanation was augmented by the assertion that the South (in particular, Army of Northern Virginia by Robert E. Lee) actually fought better and braver, but finally was crushed under the manpower of the North. A story of tragic heroes, really: the South claimed almost all of the "better" generals of the war, from "Stonewall" Jackson to Longstreet to Lee (not to count Johnston, Beauregard, and Bragg, whose fame predated the Civil War). Meanwhile, generalship of the North was, at best, hindering (stories of Burnside being burned on his side, anyone?) and at worst killed and maimed the seemingly inexhaustible stream of soldiers.

Comparison between Grant and Lee is particularly stark. Lee is widely considered to be a military genius, the beloved of the army, the hope of the Confederate and the fear of the Union. Meanwhile, Grant is generally viewed at the butcher of his own troops. Occasionally, people would "concede" things like "Grant was better at strategy; he directed an all-side attack on the Confederate" as excuses of why Lee lost. Even with those "concession," the only widely accepted reason of Lee's defeat revolved around the superiority in manpower and technologies and money of the Union. In other words, Grant contributed little (if anything beside carnage) to ultimate Union's victory.

The more I read about the Civil War, however, the less accurate this picture became. As of this point, I believe that the picture was a total lie. In fact, as I learn of the so-called "Lost Cause" of the Confederate, I am quite certain that such picture (the greatness of Lee and of the Southern military; the supposed clumsiness and bloodthirst of Grant and Northern government) was fabricated by apologists of white supremacy to excuse the South.

And I am here to clarify the story.

First, credit where credit due. Lee should not be held responsible for lack of strategy. One cannot say that Grant knew of overall strategy while Lee was ignorant. Grant was, after all, the general-in-chief of Union armies (note the plural form). Meanwhile, Lee was only command of Army of Northern Virginia. Furthermore, this position (general-in-chief of all armies) had existed within Union armies since the begin of the war. From Winfield Scott to McClellan to Halleck to Grant, Union side always had a professional general to direct their war effort. In contrast, another supposed military genius (who probably handed more victories to Grant than anyone else), Jefferson Davis, headed both civil and military command in the Confederate. So, stop scolding Lee for his "lack of strategic vision." It was not his job.

Second, another credit where credit due: Grant did not invent the multiple-front war. He merely continued it. There are 2 potential inventor of this ingenuity: Winfield Scott and Lincoln. In fact, the Union had fought on multiple fronts since the very beginning of the war. After all, the Union has absolute advantage in the sea, so Union's navy lent itself naturally to fighting in the back of the Confederate. Remember, New Orleans was captured while Grant was only a corp commander. Given that multiple general-in-chiefs came and went, credit belong to Lincoln for maintaining this strategy.

Right, now that those are out of the way (2 points above actually demean Grant), let's talk about the military career of Ulysses S. Grant. How was Grant as a tactician and strategist? Let's consider, say, battles of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson. Grant and Foote put Howe brothers (of the American Revolutionary War fame; they commanded the British army and navy) to shame. In fact, Fort Henry stood witness for how Grant was not a butcher: bombardment from the ships captured the fort without army's bloodshed. Similarly, the cooperation between navy and army proved decisive in forcing Fort Donelson to surrender. If Grant was so ignorant of tactics and so blood thirsty, he would have thrown his measly army at Fort Donelson for butchery.

Furthermore, Grant's ability was further proven with Vicksburg campaign. In fact, I maintain that this campaign outstripped Lee's exploits in term of tactics and strategy. Grant sneaked his army in between a larger force, broken down that force piece by piece. I know of only a few places where this happend: by Napoleon, by fiction, and in Chinese military textbooks. Even Hannibal should bow down to such daring and brilliant piece of strategy.

If Fort Henry and Vicksburg proved Grant's worth as a strategist, Shiloh (or Pittsburg Landing) and Wilderness proved his worth as tactician. The former (Shiloh) is particularly proving, especially in contrast to his opponent, the famous Albert Sidney Johnston. Where as Johnston acted like a colonel (he led a charge on his right wing while the commanding chain of his whole army disintegrated into chaos), Grant acted as the commanding general of the whole army. Grant remained in the center, moving troops as required, plugging holes and putting out fires. Then, when the morale sagged (even the unflabbable Sherman flinched and thought of retreating), Grant remained as cool as a cucumber. Coolness won out.

Now that we established Grant's capacity, let's talk about his manpower advantage. By 1964, the Confederate was in deep trouble. Always outmanned and outgunned, by 1964, the Confederate was cut into multiple pieces. In the West, the Union controlled Mississippi river, chopped off Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. In the deep south, Sherman would soon driver from Chattanooga down to Atlanta and the coast, cut off Alabama and Florida. This means that Lee could not marshal even the full power of the Confederate, and puts Army of Northern Virginia into serious disadvantage.

And who cut the Confederates into pieces? Ah, my man Major General Grant (when he freed Mississippi river, he was still Major General).

Thus, one can say that Grant created his own manpower and supply advantage. Now, to be fair, Union Navy's role in capturing New Orleans should also be given important credit, as well as Lincoln's strategy of envelopment. However, on land, without Grant and his victories in Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Vicksburg, Mississippi river would be blocked. Therefore, a lion share of credit for the shortage of power of the Army of Northern Virginia must go to Grant for his fine work in the west. And, remember, Grant trained Sherman in his way of war. Thus, he claimed a token of credit in the very deep south, too.

Another word on supply: Grant proved himself again here (and, to be fair, along with Halleck). His army, despite its various marvelous maneuvers, was never short of food, ammunition, and other supplies. Given that armies march on their stomach and fire their ammunition, supply chains play major role in war. Different from Lee (who operated within a few dozens of miles from his capital), Grant's army operated in far away field. Thus, Grant's ability to arrange supply for his troops was unparalleled, maybe even by George Washington himself.

As we see, Grant was a great general in his own rights. In fact, from his invention of Navy-Army joint operations at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, his brilliant maneuvers at Vicksburg, his excellent exploitation at Chattanooga, to his mastery over supply of food and ammunition, one can even argue that Grant outstripped Lee in commanding capacity. And, hey, he prevailed at the end, right? This, of course, is not to downplay Lee's brilliance. Lee was a great general (Johnston would bear witness), who was responsible for such a long existence of the Confederate. However, Grant, too, was a brilliant military commander. Yet everyone worships Lee while bashing Grant. How's that fair?

I have a few theories on the difference of treatment for the 2 equally brilliant commanders.

First was the carnage of 1864 and 1865. Too many men died. As McPherson pointed out in Battlecry of Freedom, by 1865, the Union army lost its drive due to the sheer amount of of turn over. And this turn over was from casualty. As the general-in-chief, Grant shouldered the blame for this. However, one must understand that there was frankly no other way. Grant and Lee were locked into this situation: there was about 100 miles between the Richmond and Washington DC; any, um, creative movement risked the other side breaking through. And breaking through meant lost of the national capital. Thus, frontal assault was required.

Second, Lee enjoyed a kind of sacred aura. It should be reminded that Lee's own grand victories (Seven Days battle, Chancellorsville, his 2 attempts to the North) cost many tens of thousands of casualties. And we have not counted the defeats (Gettysburg and the final campaign). In fact, Grant's greatest victories (beside 1864-1865 campaigns) cost way few casualties proportional to Lee's victories. However, Lee's aura of brilliance deflects this kind of analysis. People are content to say "yeah, Lee battled here and there and the Union armies were defeated," and not "well, Lee's men died by the thousands." True, Lee must do what he did. But so must Grant!

Thirdly, Lee's brilliance shined right in the most important theater: the hundred miles between the 2 capitals. Grant's awesome campaigns happened in the back water of the West. The history books (besides those talking about Grant specifically) would talk glowingly at length about Lee's exploits while giving 1-sentence summary of Grant's victories. Thus, Lee's brilliance is emphasized. And Grant?

Fourthly, the time of Grant in the limelight was the time of carnage. Grant arrived in Washington in 1864 and proceeded to start the bloody campaign for Richmond. Thus, talking about Grant means talking about the staggering blood of 1864 and 1865. In contrast with Lee's emphasize on brilliance, Grant got the emphasize on death and casualty.

Lastly, and I think this is the deciding factory, the "Lost Cause" movement of apologists in the South post-bellum. Those wanted to excuse their side while demonize the other. Grant, as the victorious general and the president of Reconstruction, was the must-aim target. Lee, as the model of Southern gentry, was the must-praise hero. And revisionists did their work. After those historical revision, Lee emerges as an angel while Grant sinks as butcher.

My opinion of Civil War is like this: the Union deserved to win. They fought for a worthy cause: the preservation of their country (sorry, but most of them were quite racist; emancipation was forced, not driven). The Confederation deserved to loses. For God's sake, they fought for their rights to enslave human beings! What kind of states fight for such sickening rights? And they was given an appropriate man for the job. Ulysses S. Grant was probably among the top 5 generals that this country ever has the honor to host. And we should appreciate that.